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This research describes the Acquisition Process of the Armed Forces of the Philippines 
(AFP) Modernization Program, particularly the role, functions and importance of Program 
Managers (PM) and Program Management Teams (PMT) in the overall process. The 
Modernization Program, including acquisition processes for new systems, is a new experience 
for the AFP. Apparently, the organization intends to optimize the acquisition process for new 
systems by ensuring an effective and accountable organization structure that would sustain AFP 
modernization efforts and capabilities.   
Presently, PMs and PMTs are temporary in the organizational structure and have no 
concretely delineated role in the acquisition process. Their function and responsibilities are 
limited to the AFP Major Service requirement generation process. 
 Likewise, this research will introduce the US DoD acquisition system and illustrate the 
DoD PMs’ and IPTs’ roles and functions in defense programs. The paper will show the 
importance of the PM and IPTs to the overall life cycle of any system.  By comparative analysis, 
the research will reveal limitations in the AFP approach. The US Acquisition model, relative to 
PMs and PMTs, will be useful for improving the AFP process. After all, the US has proven itself 
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
A.  PURPOSE  
This research determines and establishes standard roles and functions for Program 
Managers and Program Management Teams in the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) 
Modernization Program Acquisition Process. To do this, existing laws, rules, and regulations 
pertaining to AFP acquisitions will be evaluated to ascertain roles and functions that the Program 
Managers and Program Management Teams can perform to ensure optimal results in acquiring 
new systems for the AFP, including sustainability and system disposal. This study will then 
assess the organization and management approaches to the acquisition processes, specifically 
Program Managers and Teams in the United States of America and Philippines defense 
establishments, and compare these systems and processes to determine problem areas in the AFP 
acquisition system. This research will also offer a unique understanding of the US acquisition 
system, recognizing the importance of PMs and IPTs in streamlining the acquisition decision 
process. Finally, this thesis provides an organizational framework for PM and PMT in the 
Modernization Program Acquisition process that is both applicable and suitable for the AFP. 
However, it also acknowledges the limitation of applying the US model since the AFP’s 
acquisition process has evolved over time. 
B.  BENEFIT OF THE STUDY  
The research will benefit the Department of National Defense, the Armed Forces of the 
Philippines, particularly the three major services, and other Government Agencies, which 
undertake major program or project acquisition, or even construction in line with their mandate 
of public service. With this objective in mind, the paper could serve as a pioneering basis for 
establishing Program Manager and Program Management Teams in all major acquisition 
programs in the AFP, and perhaps, in other agencies, to assure taxpayers an optimal return to 
their money in all government programs.  
C.  RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
To accomplish the purpose of this paper, fundamental research questions were developed.  
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1.   Primary 
   Can the organization and management of Program Managers and Program Management 
Teams in the AFP Modernization Program Acquisition Process be improved using the US DoD 
acquisition model as frame of reference? 
  2.  Secondary 
• Is the current acquisition process of the Armed Forces of the Philippines customer 
(defense providers) friendly and responsive? 
• Is there a need to reengineer the acquisition process to expand the responsibility of the 
Program Managers and Program Management Teams of the Armed Forces of the 
Philippines? 
• Are the Program Managers and Program Management Teams effective and efficient in 
the current acquisition process of the Armed Forces of the Philippines? 
• Are the strengths and weaknesses of the Program Managers and Program Management 
Teams in both countries determinable and comparable? 
• What would be the advantages and disadvantages of applying the US Acquisition model 
to the Armed Forces of the Philippines? 
D.  SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS  
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The scope of this thesis will be limited to developing an organizational framework and 
guidelines pertaining to the role and functions of Program Managers and Program Management 
Teams in the AFPMP acquisition processes for new systems. Pertinent Philippine laws, rules and 
regulations that impact the organization and functions of Program Managers and Program 
Management Teams in all Modernization Acquisition Programs will be examined and studied to 
establish their relevance to a more effective AFPMP. This thesis does not solve other issues or 
problems affecting the implementation of the AFPMP, nor does it supersede Department of 
National Defense (DND) Circular Number 1, implementing guidelines, rules, and regulations 
(IGRR) for the AFPMP. This study intends to provide a more organized and clearly defined 
process for concerned stakeholders of any given system in the acquisition program than what 
currently exists in the Philippine Defense establishment, as warranted. This thesis will conclude 
by recommending adopting an organizational framework and guide for both Program Managers 
and Program Management Teams to apply in acquiring any new Defense system or platform. 
Likewise, it provides appropriate suggestions for amending rules and regulations, when such 
changes are needed.  
E.  LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY  
The authors initially extracted data from previous and existing literature on the subject, as 
well as existing laws, rules, and regulations affecting the AFPMP. Online library catalogs and 
periodical databases were accessed. Relevant books, articles and other documents are cited as a 
result of these literature searches and are duly acknowledged in the List of References. 
Interviews, both personal and by-long distance telephone calls, were also conducted to gather 
first hand data from concerned AFP officials and practitioners. The information gathered were 
analyzed using both empirical and subjective study to determine whether there is a need to 
clearly define, identify, strengthen and firmly establish the roles and functions of Program 
Managers and Program Management Teams in the Acquisition Process, based on the overall 
impact of their contribution in acquiring and sustaining a system over its operational life cycle.  
F.  ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY  
This Thesis consists of six chapters. Chapter I present the purpose, scope and 
methodology of the research. Chapter II provides a background about the Philippines and a 
discussion of the AFP Modernization Act, the implementing guidelines, rules, and regulations of 
the Act, and other statutes, rules and regulations that affect the AFP Modernization Program. 
This chapter also discusses the AFP acquisition process and planning. Chapter III describes the 
AFP Program Management in Defense Acquisition, including the current roles of Program 
Managers and Program Management Teams, the Key Players in the Acquisition Process, and 
Profiles of the AFP Acquisition Workforce. Chapter IV describes the US DoD Program 
Management in Defense Acquisition. It addresses the Program Management Infrastructure and 
Processes relative to system acquisition. Chapter V is a comparative analysis and assessment of 
both the US and Philippine Defense Acquisition System, considering the utilization of Program 
Managers and Program Management Teams in the Acquisition Process. It analyses all 
information gathered from the research as described in the preceding chapters. Finally, Chapter 
VI answers the research questions, presents conclusions and recommendations regarding 
establishing a suitable and applicable organizational framework and standard guidelines to utilize 


































II.  AFP MODERNIZATION PROGRAM 
A.  BACKGROUND  
This chapter gives an overview of the Philippines. It provides a basic history, culture, 
government, economy, the defense establishment, and background of the Filipino people, among 
others.  
Furthermore, it reviews the AFP acquisition process for the AFPMP. It contains summary 
reviews on pertinent laws, statutes, rules, and regulations governing the Armed Forces of the 
Philippines Modernization Program and describes of the current AFP Acquisition Process.  
B.  ABOUT THE PHILIPPINES  
The Philippine archipelago is geographically located between China and Borneo. The 
country consists of 7,107 islands, including Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao. The city of Manila is 
located on the island of Luzon. There are 14 regions, 73 provinces and 60 cities across the 
country. The climate is tropical with two  seasons: wet and dry.  
The Philippines is the third largest English-speaking country in the world, with an 
estimated population of 78 million. Although Pilipino or Tagalog is the national language, 
English is the language normally used for business, education and legal transactions. The 
Philippine education system is patterned after the American system, with English as the medium 
of instruction. There are a number of foreign schools with study programs similar to those in the 
United States.  
The Philippines is the only country in Asia that is predominantly Christian, with 80 
percent of its population belonging to the Roman Catholic faith. The country has over a hundred 
ethnic groups and a mixture of foreign influences. The kaleidoscopes of cultures have created a 
unique Filipino culture over the years. 
Three Philippine Constitutions have evolved as the country develops a democratic system 
of government. It has a presidential form of government, much like in the United States of 
America. The economy is basically hinged on agriculture and light industry. The country is rich 
in mineral resources. Likewise, the country has well-developed industries in food processing, 
textiles, clothing, wood, forest products and home appliances, with fast-growing aquaculture, 
5
microcircuit, garments and furniture sectors. It has recently begun developing natural gas as a 
power source. 
C.  DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE  
1.  Background  
The Philippine Department of National Defense (DND) was formally organized on 
November 1, 1939, pursuant to Executive Order No. 230. It was tasked to implement the 
National Defense Act (Commonwealth Act No. 1) passed by the National Assembly on 
December 31, 1935 and Commonwealth Act No. 340, creating the DND.  
DND is primarily responsible for (a) providing necessary protection to the State and its 
National Territories against both external and internal threats; (b) directing, planning and 
supervising the National Defense Program; (c) maintaining law and order throughout the 
country; and (d) performing other functions as may be provided for by law. It is charged with 
supervising the country’s National Defense Program. It is also responsible for overseeing field 
operations, to judiciously and effectively implement National Defense and Security Programs. 
The Department exercises executive supervision over the Armed Forces of the Philippines 
(AFP), the Government Arsenal (GA), the Office of Civil Defense (OCD), the Philippine 
Veterans Affairs Office (PVAO), and the National Defense College of the Philippines (NDCP).  
The Undersecretary for National Defense (USND), the most senior undersecretary in the 
DND, is responsible for implementing the AFP modernization program. He is also responsible, 
policy-wise, for modernization programs in the Government Arsenal and the Self Reliance 
Defense Posture. Furthermore, he is responsible for developing and monitoring defense-security 
policy formulation at the macro level in coordination with the Undersecretary for Operations and 
Undersecretary for Civil Relations (USCR), including the AFP 5-year development program.  
2.  The Armed Forces of the Philippines  
The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) is responsible for upholding the sovereignty, 
supporting the Constitution, and defending the National Territory of the Republic against all 
enemies, foreign and domestic; advancing the national aims, interests and policies; planning and 
organization; and maintenance, development and deployment of its regular and citizen reserve 
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forces for national security. The AFP provides and ensures a stable and secure environment so 
that the government can build and sustain a stable, just and progressive society for the citizenry.  
Its functions include the following:  
a.   Secure and protect the State against all forms of threats- either external or internal.  
b.  Pursue activities, which shall project the image of the AFP as the protector of the 
people and a partner of government in nation building. 
c.    Assist in maintaining peace and order and law enforcement activities.  
d. Pursue the Self-Reliant Defense Posture (SRDP) Program to reduce foreign 
dependence for defense materials and technology, and develop a viable defense industry to 
promote economic developmental activities and progress.  
D.  PERTINENT STATUTES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS  
In line with its Constitutionally mandated mission and function, the AFP received 
authority to obtain new weapons systems and other equipment from the Republic Act (RA) 7898, 
otherwise known as the AFP Modernization Act. This statute was signed into law on 23 February 
1995. RA7898 empowers the AFP to modernize its forces to a degree where it can fully and 
effectively perform its mandate to defend sovereignty, and protect and preserve the national 
patrimony of the Republic of the Philippines.  
The Modernization Law also specifies the size and shape of the AFP in terms of 
personnel strength, equipment and facilities that the Defense establishment will have to develop 
within a fifteen-year period. In support of  RA7898, the AFP Modernization Program was 
approved by Congress through Joint Resolution (JR) Number 28 on 19 December 1996. This 
resolution prescribes the size and organizational structure of the AFP as it goes through the 
modernization process. It addresses capability development in the AFP across the five 
components identified in the overall modernization program. The five programs include force 
restructuring and organizational development, material and technology development, base 
development, human resource development and doctrines development.  
To jumpstart the Modernization Program, 50 Billion pesos for the first five years was to 
be appropriated through the AFP Modernization Act Trust Fund (AFPMATF).  
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RA 7898 essentially requires the Defense establishment to:  
1. Give preference to Filipino contractors and suppliers or foreign contractors and 
suppliers willing and able to locate a substantial portion of production in the Philippines;  
2. Incorporate in each contract/agreement, as much as possible, provisions for counter-
trade, in-country manufacture, co-production schemes or other innovative agreements; and  
3. Include in the contract transferring the principal technology involved for the AFP to 
operate and maintain.  
The DND Circular No. 29, “Implementing Guidelines to RA 7898,” was issued on 19 
May 1996. DND Circular No. 1, “Implementing Guidelines, Rules, and Regulations (IGRR) of 
the AFP Modernization Program” superseded this. The IGRR provides details on the objectives 
of the statute and defines the policies for implementing the five components of the 
Modernization Program. It also describes the acquisition process under the AFPMP.  
Other laws, rules, and regulations that impact on the AFP acquisition process include the 
following:  
1. Executive Order No. 40 (EO 40)  
Issued on 08 October 2001, which consolidates the procurement rules and procedures for 
all national government agencies, government-owned or controlled corporations, and 
government financial institutions, and requires using the government electronic procurement 
system. It provides for preparing, maintaining, and updating  a Procurement Management Plan 
and establishing a single Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) subject to certain exceptions, 
including complexity and number of items to be procured. Additionally, EO 40 mandates that all 
government agencies use the Electronic Procurement System (EPS) in accordance with the 
policies, rules, regulations, and procedures adopted by the Procurement Policy Board (PPB). 
2. Executive Order No. 262 (EO 262)  
Issued on 05 July 2000, amended Executive Order No. 302 of 1996 and Executive Order 
201 issued in 2000. It provides the policies, guidelines, rules, and regulations for procuring 
goods and supplies by the national government. EO 262 also provides guidelines for creating the 
Pre-qualification, Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC). This EO governs procurement contracts 
under the capability, materiel and technology development component of the Program.  
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3. Executive Order No. 109 (EO 109) 
Issued in May 2002, streamlines the rules and procedures for reviewing and approving all 
contracts entered into by departments, bureaus, offices, and government agencies. EO 109 
authorizes the department secretary full authority to enter into all government contracts and to 
give final approval on contracts entered into by their respective departments, bureaus, offices and 
agencies.  
4. Executive Order No. 120 (EO 120) 
 Issued in 1993, its implementing rules and regulations direct the national government, its 
departments, bureaus, agencies and offices, to include government-owned and controlled 
corporations, and to adopt counter-trade as a trade tool for procurement contracts worth US One 
Million Dollars or more ($ 1.0 M). Based on recent developments, the Secretary of National 
Defense (SND) has set the counter-trade requirement to 100%. 
5. Department of Finance/Department of Budget/Commission on Audit Joint 
Circular Number 4-98  
Provides rules and regulations for properly handling and administering the AFP 
Modernization Trust Fund (AFPMPTF).  
6. AFP Manual 4-2, AFP Procurement System Issued in 1995 
 Provides for logistics support management and describes the acquisition system, 
policies, and procedures for acquiring major systems consistent with RA 7898 and the IGRR.  
7. AFP Manual 4-6, AFP Capital Equipment Acquisition Manual 
Institutionalizes the capital equipment acquisition process in the AFP. It serves as a guide 
for acquiring major capital equipment in the AFP and discusses the equipment acquisition 
organization, the code of ethics, the acquisition process, risk management, and the self-reliant 
defense program.  
8. AFP Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) Number 6, 7, 8, and  
9 All Issued on 30 August 2000 
 SOP No. 6 creates the AFP Modernization Board and prescribes the functions, 
composition, duties and responsibilities of the AFP Modernization Board members, governing 
policies and procedures. SOP No. 7 defines the functions, organization, duties and 
responsibilities of the Pre-qualification, Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) members, policies 
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and procedures regarding the BAC. SOP No. 8 prescribes the functions, composition, duties and 
responsibilities of members, policies and procedures for the Project Management Teams (PMTs). 
SOP No. 9 provides for the policies and procedures used to procure equipment and weapons 
systems under the AFP Modernization Program.  
9. AFP Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) Number 2 Issued in  
February 1997  
 Creates the Bids, Awards, and Negotiations Committee, amended to the Bids and 
Awards Committee (BANC), and prescribes their composition, functions, and responsibilities. 
The BANC is assigned one modernization project. It is tasked to evaluate and select a contractor 
and subsequently prepare the contract for that project. The BAC is dissolved following contract 
approval and signing.  
10. Philippine Navy Circular Number 2 Series of 1993 or the PN  
Ship Acquisition Project Management System (SAPMS)  
Established the SAPMS for effective implementation of the PN Fleet Modernization 
Programs even before the AFP Modernization Act was passed. It prescribed policies and 
procedures for the SAPMS and prescribed the functions, composition, duties, and responsibilities 
of the Ship Acquisition Project Management Team (SAPMT). While still applicable, this circular 
has been superseded by other issuances from higher headquarters. 
The AFP Modernization Act and the other issuances, guidelines, rules, and regulations 
pertaining thereto provide detailed procurement procedures for the AFPMP. As observed, the 
statutes and policies promulgated are less explicit regarding acquisition planning and the roles 
and functions of Program Managers and Program Management Teams over the system being 
acquired. The statutes and policies merely provide a format for the Project Management 
Acquisition Plan. These laws and issuances are not clear on what training or education is 
required, or how to provide the necessary training and education for personnel who will be 
designated as either Program Managers or members of Program Management Teams for the 
AFP. There is no clear identification of the role and functions of the PM and PMT over system 
acquisition nor are there guidelines in the qualification and designation of such positions. Of 
significant importance to the success of AFPMP equipment and weapons systems acquisitions is 
a workforce that has the education, experience, and training for requirement generation, program 
management and contract negotiations. As it is, who is responsible for the acquisition plan is not 
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explicitly identified. One can only assume that the overall acquisition plan for a desired system is 
within the responsibility and function of a program manager and/or a program management 
team.  
The AFP has very few officers who have the education and training for acquisition 
planning, with many involved in requirement generation and negotiations and contracting. While 
the AFP does not lack strategic planners, it does lack acquisition and contract planners. The AFP 
has two qualified contracting officers who just graduated from the Naval Postgraduate School, 
Monterey California, but has no qualified program managers who have the education and 
experience for acquisition planning, and contracting.  
The basis for acquisition planning in the AFP Modernization Program is the IGRR. The 
IGRR mandates that the Major Services plan the procurement for equipment or weapons systems 
without the attendant responsibility for contract negotiation. However, the IGRR does not 
provide for more logical and specific guidelines for acquisition planning except to say that the 
Project Management Teams (PMTs) of the Major Services are responsible for single 
procurement project from identification up to implementation. While it is true that the PMTs are 
responsible for formulating the CORs and the BEPs, it is not quite clear how these are going to 
be conducted and what standards are to be followed in the planning process. The IGRR is much 
too vague for the Major Services to provide a realistic and responsive acquisition plan for the 
AFP Modernization Program.  
AFP Manual 4-2 provides that the cognizant program manager, among all other duties, 
develops an acquisition strategy tailored to the acquisition program; but it does not say how the 
strategy is to be developed. The acquisition strategy provides the basis for the acquisition plan, 
however this is not included in the manual. This manual provides policies and issues that should 
be considered in acquisition planning, including promoting and sustaining competition, 
integrated logistics support, life-cycle costing, source selection and evaluation procedures, 
contract award and administration. However, these are not presented in a coherent and structured 
manner like in an acquisition plan.  
AFP Manual 4-6 provides for organizing PMTs in accordance with the IGRR. Its broadly 
stated responsibilities are to monitor and review records of proceedings of all committees/ 
agencies working on the project, implement the contract, monitor progress of the project after 
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turn-over to the user, and turn-over the project to concerned staff when appropriate. The 
emphasis of this manual is, once again, on the acquisition process, although it provides more 
policies than AFP Manual 4-2. It incorporates detailed project risk management over cost, 
schedule, and performance. This manual only has a project management acquisition plan format 
as an annex, without the necessary guidelines on how to accomplish it.  
E.  THE AFP ACQUISITION PROCESS  
Before the abrogation of the US Bases Treaty in 1991 and the passage of the AFP 
Modernization Act, acquisition was not a major defense activity. Weapon systems were normally 
provided through FMS as part of US military aid to the Philippine Government.  
       Requirements generation had a very simple structure whereby the major services 
determined their own requirements through their weapons board. The major services weapons 
boards submitted their requirements to the major service commander for endorsement to AFP 
General Headquarters. They were then reviewed by the AFP Weapons Board and submitted to 
the Chief of Staff AFP (CSAFP) for his subsequent approval. The approved requirements were 
then forwarded to the SND for approval prior to acquisition. The requirements were then 
provided by the US through its Foreign Military Sales program and the major service usually 
received what the US decided best addressed the military need. There were no appropriate laws, 
rules or regulations that could guide acquisition for major defense projects, mainly because the 
Philippine defense establishment never really embarked on such activities.  
There was no acquisition organization, much less Program Managers and Program 
Management Teams, for major acquisition programs and this is the situation that exists today, 
even after passing the AFP Modernization Act. The acquisition process for the AFPMP 
capability development programs changed. In addition, numerous government statutes and 
policies hindered or even terminated programs implementation. Political uncertainty in program 
implementation is further aggravated by financial resource constraints associated with the 
country’s depressed economic situation. 
AFPMP acquisition and contracting is conducted in two stages: the equipment acquisition 
stage (project definition and validation); and the contract negotiation stage. The following 
activities are conducted during project identification and validation:  
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1.  Major Services organize their respective Project Management Teams (PMTs), 
each of which is responsible for a single procurement project in both identification and 
implementation stages, upon approval from higher headquarters. PMTs normally include a 
minimum of three officers, headed by the project manager. They are responsible for formulating 
the Circulars of Requirements (CORs), which define the operational and technical requirements 
of the Major Services, and the Bid Evaluation Plan (BEP), which includes the procedure for 
acquiring equipment or weapons systems and indicate the method of procurement, the  pre-
qualification of bidders, and the bidding process up to and including contract award. The Major 
Service Modernization Board reviews and validates the CORs and BEPs and the Major Service 
Commander endorses it to the AFP Modernization Board.  
2.  The AFP Modernization Boards, together with the AFP-DND Technical Working 
Group, review and validate the CORs and BEPs (Figure 2-1). The record of its proceedings is 
then appended to its recommendations to the Chief of Staff, AFP and contains all the 
deliberations between the AFP Modernization Board, AFP-DND Technical Working Group, and 
the Major Service Modernization Board. CORs and BEPs are submitted to the Secretary of 
National Defense for approval, but are reviewed by the DND Review Board before the SND 
issues the Procurement Directive (Figure 2-2).  
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Figure 2-1 AFP Acquisition Process (From Ref. 12) 
 
AFP ACQUISITION PROCESS
STEPS MAJOR SERVICE GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
DEPARTMENT OF 
NATIONAL DEFENSE









Board Review  & 
Validates  
MS Com m ander
endorses Project to 
GHQ
AFP Modernization 
Board Review s &  
Validates COR & BEP
CSAFP Recom m ends
Approval of 
COR & BEP
DND Review  Board
 
Figure 2-2 AFP Acquisition Process (From Ref. 12) 
 
The second stage, contract negotiation, starts at the AFP General Headquarters and 
includes the following activities: 
1.  After receiving the Procurement Directive from the SND, the CSAFP then creates 
the Bids And Awards Committee which is responsible for determining eligibility, evaluating 
bids, conducting the bidding, post-qualifying the most advantageous bid (MAB) and 
recommending the contract award. Figure 2-3 shows the BAC bidding process. At this point, the 
Joint Counter Trade Working Group (JCWG) evaluates the technical and financial aspects of the 
bid and the economic packages associated with it, and submits its evaluations to the BAC. The 
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Figure 2-3 BANC Bidding Process for the AFPMP (From Ref. 12) 
  
2.   The SND approves the MAB and issues the Notice of Award. 
3.  The BAC then prepares and finalizes the contract, assisted by the AFPMP 
Modernization Office, and the CSAFP reviews and endorses the contract to the SND. Upon 
signing the contract with the winning bidder, the SND issues a Notice to Proceed. 
Copies of the approved contract are forwarded to Congress, if it is multi-year contract, to 
enable Congress to appropriate funds for the contract pursuant to Section (b) and (c) of Republic 
Act 7898. If it is a negotiated contract that exceeds 300 million pesos, the National Economic 
and Development Authority Reviews and approves the contract prior to its implementation 
(Figure 2-4).  
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Figure 2-4 AFP Acquisition Process (From Ref. 12) 
 
4. The PMT then implements the contract. Acquisition planning for the AFPMP is 
built into the acquisition and contracting process, but, as mentioned earlier, there are no 
structures, standards or guidelines for the Major Services PMT to implement the contract based 
on an acquisition plan.  
As summarily stated earlier, the AFP has no experience in actual major acquisition of 
systems wherein it spends internal funds and not money or grants given as foreign assistance. 
Before, AFP acquisitions mostly came through Foreign Military Sales (FMS) funds from the US. 
This inexperience in major acquisitions, such as for the AFPMP, underscores the importance of 
having an acquisition plan to establish a logical and systematic approach to meet a government 
need and a pool of qualified and credible Program Managers and Program Management Teams 
to oversee the system acquisition and life-cycle. 
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F.  CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter gave an overview of the Philippines, its history, political system, people, 
economy, and religion. More importantly, the literature review revealed that the role and 
functions of Program Managers and Program Management Teams in a system’s acquisition and 
life cycle is not clearly defined nor is the importance of these functions appreciated in the overall 
acquisition process. While the equipment acquisition process itself is clear, there is a need to 
identify and establish the importance of the PM and PMT in the system’s existence. In prevailing 
statutes, rules, and regulations cited in this chapter, the PM and PMT roles, functions and 
importance was never given the recognition they deserve. The only regulation that even mentions 
PMs and PMTs in great detail is the AFP Manual 4-6.  
Given the importance and complexity of acquisition, including contract negotiation and 
supervision, and monitoring the system life cycle, and because the AFP has very little experience 
in major systems, programs or projects, using PM and PMT to oversee the system is not an 
option but a necessity for ensuring success.  
The next chapter will address AFP Program Management in Defense Acquisition, 
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 III.   AFP PROGRAM MANAGEMENTAND THE ACQUISITION 
PROCESS 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
The Armed Forces of the Philippines Modernization Program is based on Republic Act 
7898, AFP Modernization Act, promulgated on 21 February 1995 and supplemented by 
Congressional Joint Resolution No. 28, dated 19 December 1996. The Joint Resolution 
prescribes the size and organizational structure of the AFP as it undertakes the modernization 
endeavor.  
AFP Modernization is focused on the five (5) main capability development thrusts: Force 
Restructuring and Organizational Development, Material and Technology Development, Base 
Development, Human Resource Development and Doctrine Development.  
To implement the Modernization Program, the Department of National Defense 
formulated DND Circular No. 29, entitled “Implementing Guidelines to RA 7898,” was issued 
on 19 May 1996. DND Circular No. 1, “Implementing Guidelines, Rules, and Regulations 
(IGRR) of the AFP Modernization Program” superseded this. The IGRR provides details on the 
statutes’ objectives. It defines the policies for realizing the five components of the Modernization 
Program. It also describes the acquisition process under the AFPMP.  
In summary, AFPMP acquisition and contracting is conducted in two major stages: the 
equipment acquisition stage (project definition and validation); and the contract negotiation 
stage.  The equipment acquisition stage includes the following: 
1.  Major Services organize their respective Project Management Teams (PMTs), 
each of which is responsible for a single procurement project in all its stages, from identification 
up to implementation, except the Contract Negotiation stage. PMTs normally include a minimum 
of three officers, headed by the project manager. They are responsible for formulating the 
Circulars of Requirements (CORs), which define the operational and technical requirements of 
the Major Services, and the Bid Evaluation Plan (BEP), which includes the procedure for  
acquiring equipment or weapons systems, including the method of procurement, the pre-
qualification of bidders, and the bidding process up to and including the contract award. The 
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Major Service Modernization Board reviews and validates the CORs and BEP, and the Major 
Service Commander endorses it to the AFP Modernization Board.  
2. The AFP Modernization Board, together with the AFP-DND Technical Working 
Group, reviews and validates the CORs and BEPs. The records of its proceedings are appended 
to its recommendations to the Chief of Staff, AFP and contain all the deliberations between the 
cognizant AFP Modernization Board, AFP-DND Technical Working Group, and the Major 
Service Modernization Board. CORs and BEPs are submitted to the Secretary of National 
Defense for approval, but are reviewed by the DND Review Board before the SND issues the 
Procurement Directive.  
The second stage, contract negotiation, starts at the AFP General Headquarters and 
includes following the activities.  
1.  After receiving the Procurement Directive from the SND, the CSAFP creates the 
Bids And Awards Committee, which is responsible for determining eligibility, evaluating bids, 
conducting the bidding, post-qualifying the most advantageous bid (MAB) and recommending 
the contract award. Figure 2-3 shows the BAC bidding process. At this point, the Joint Counter 
trade Working Group (JCWG) evaluates the technical and financial aspects of the bid and the 
associated economic packages, and submits its evaluations to the BAC. The CSAFP then 
endorses the MAB to the SND for approval.  
2.  The SND approves the MAB and issues the Notice of Award.  
3.  The BAC then prepares and finalizes the contract with assistance from the 
AFPMP Modernization Office. Thereafter, the CSAFP reviews and endorses the contract to the 
SND. Upon signing the contract with the winning bidder, the SND  issues the Notice to Proceed.  
Copies of the approved contract are forwarded to Congress when it is a multi-year 
contract to enable Congress to appropriate funds for the contract pursuant to Section (b) and (c) 
of Republic Act 7898.  If it is a negotiated contract that exceeds 300 million pesos, the National 
Economic and Development Authority Reviews and approves the contract prior to its 
implementation. 
4. The PMT then implements the contract. Acquisition planning for the AFPMP is 
part of the acquisition and contract process, but, as mentioned earlier, there are no structures, 
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standards or guidelines for the Major Services PMT to implement the contract based on an 
acquisition plan.  
B.  STAKEHOLDERS IN THE ACQUISITION PROCESS 
The following agencies and entities are crucial in the AFP Modernization Program 
Acquisition Process for an identified system to be acquired by the Armed Forces of the 
Philippines, arranged by hierarchical authority over the program: 
Congress (Senate and House of Representatives) – provides funds for the AFP 
Modernization program. 
The President and Commander In Chief – approves all contracts under the AFPMP 
worth Fifty Million Pesos (P 50,000,000.00) or more, whether multi or single year. 
National Economic Development Authority (NEDA)- a government entity that reviews 
and evaluates contracts for Presidential approval.  
Philippine International and Trade Commission (PITC) – a government entity that 
evaluates counter-trade agreements in contract packages connected with AFPMP system 
acquisition. 
Department of National Defense (DND) – exercises executive supervision over the 
Armed Forces of the Philippines, and six (6) other Bureaus related to National Defense. 
DND Review Board (DNDRB) – a Department of National Defense created entity that 
evaluates bids being placed for subsequent approval or endorsement by the Secretary of National 
Defense. 
Secretary of National Defense (SND) – refers to the Head of the DND, who approves 
all contracts under the AFPMP worth less than Fifty Million Pesos (P 50,000,000.00) and 
categorized as a single-year contract. 
Defense Modernization Office (DMO) – created at the Department of National Defense 
to supervise and implement the AFP Modernization Program. 
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) – refers to the military establishment comprised 
of three major services – the Philippine Army, the Philippine Navy and the Philippine Air Force. 
AFP-Joint Counter Trade Working Group (JCWG) – evaluates the counter-trade 
component of bids or offers and prepares the counter-trade agreements. 
Chief of Staff, AFP (CSAFP) – refers to the Head of the Armed Forces of the 
Philippines. 
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Senior Management Oversight Committee (SMOC) – exercises supervisory and 
review functions over the Bids, Awards, and Negotiations Committee (BANC). It includes the 
different component committee chairman of the AFP Modernization Board (The Deputy Chief of 
Staff for Personnel, J1; The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, J3; The Deputy Chief of Staff 
for Logistics, J4; The Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Programs, J5; The Deputy Chief of 
Staff for Comptrollership, J6; and The Deputy of Staff for Education and Training, J8), Chief of 
Staff of the Major Services, The Judge Advocate General, AFP (TJAG), and is headed by the 
Deputy Chief of Staff, AFP (TDCS). 
AFP Modernization Program Management Office (AFPMPMO) – assists and advises 
the CSAFP in managing and implementing the AFP Modernization Program, and in generating 
funds for the AFP Modernization Act Trust Fund. 
AFP Modernization Board (AFPMB) - also known as the AFP Weapons Systems 
board, reviews and validates the Circular of Requirements (CORs) and Bid Evaluation Plans 
(BEPs). It serves as the advisory body of the CSAFP in implementing the AFPMP. 
Bids Awards and Negotiation Committee (BANC) – manages Contract Negotiation, 
including the public bidding process. 
BANC Secretariat - an administrative group composed of representatives from 
cognizant  J-staffs, which provide general administrative support to all BANCs 
Major Services -  refers to the three armed services of the AFP, namely: Philippine 
Army (PA), Philippine Navy (PN) and Philippine Air Force (PAF). The equipment acquisition 
stage starts at the Major Services level. 
Program Managers (PM) - an officer designated by Major Services to head a Program 
Management Team in forming the Circular of Requirement and Bid Evaluation Plan for a system 
considered for acquisition by that Major Service. 
Program Management Teams (PMT) - a team of officers designated by the Major 
Services to formulate the Circular of Requirement and Bid Evaluation Plan for a system 
considered for acquisition by that Major Service. 
Major Service Modernization Program Offices - assist and advise their respective 
Commanders in managing and implementing the Major Service modernization projects. 
Major Services Modernization Boards - serve as the advisory body of their respective 
Major Service Commanders in implementing the Major Services Modernization Program. 
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C.  AFP MODERNIZATION PROGRAM MANAGEMENT  
Using the US definition, Program Management, is a process whereby a single leader 
exercises authority and responsibility for planning, organizing, staffing, controlling, and leading 
the combined efforts of participating/assigned civilian and military personnel and organizations, 
to manage a specific Defense acquisition program or programs, through development, 
production, deployment, operations, support, and disposal. The AFP has a limited role in the 
development process.  
AFP Program Management encompasses the whole acquisition process, however, a 
particular system is handled at various level of the process by different entities with diverse 
functions and authority. Overall, the acquisition system goes through a step-by-step process, 
without a particular or designated specialized oversight group of people to ensure that the 
process flows unhampered. Likewise, project management in the AFP does not include the 
whole life cycle of a system or equipment. It is limited to acquisition alone and the future plans 
for modification or upgrade to the system are left uncertain. 
D.  CURRENT ROLE OF PM AND PMT 
In the AFP Modernization Program, Program Managers and Project Management  
Teams are organized at the major service level. They are tasked to formulate the Circular of 
Requirements and Bid Evaluation Plan for a specifically identified system considered for 
acquisition. After formulating both documents, PM and PMT await contract approval, after it 
goes through the defense bureaucracy, for subsequent implementation. Implementation of the 
contract, in this stage, is not clearly defined by any policy but is rooted in the contract provisions. 
In the AFP setting, PM and PMT are designated by their major services, depending on 
their qualifications relative to the type and capability of a weapon system being considered for 
acquisition. PM and PMT members are temporarily designated to their function. Said function 
may not be primary and could be assigned as collateral duties. Also, since PM and PMT duties 
are temporary, the team immediately dissolves once the contract is implemented. 
E.  SUMMARY 
This chapter gave a summary of the AFPMP Acquisition Process, the Major Stakeholders 
that encompass the whole System Acquisition Process, and the role and functions of the Program 
Managers and Project Management Teams in this process. 
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The role and functions of Program Managers and Project Management Teams in the 
acquisition and life cycle of a system are not clearly defined nor is their importance clearly 
appreciated in the overall acquisition process. While the equipment acquisition process itself is 
clear, there is a need to identify and establish the importance of the PM and PMT in the system.  
In the prevailing statutes, rules, and regulations, PM and PMT roles, functions and importance 
has never been given the importance it deserves. Given the complexity of acquisition, the role 
and functions of the PM and PMTs is crucial in the overseeing of a system acquisition. At 
present, the acquisition process is full of political power play rather than technical oversight over 
a system acquisition.  
The next chapter will present the US DoD Acquisition model and will provide insight 
into the roles and functions of the Program Manager and Program Management Teams in the 



















IV. THE US DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PROGRAM   
MANAGEMENT IN DEFENSE ACQUISITION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
US Defense Acquisition process is so complex that DoD needs to designate a single 
leader to centralize authority and responsibility over the corresponding activities. In this context, 
DoD made a policy to designate program managers on all Defense systems programs. They serve 
as agents of the military service or Defense agency, and as such their prime responsibility is to 
direct, develop, produce, and initially deploy the Defense system and to ensure that the war 
fighters’ modernization requirements are met efficiently and effectively. All activities of the 
acquisition process have to be conducted within the limits of cost, schedule, and performance, as 
approved by the program manager’s executive. Details of the acquisition process will be 
discussed later in the chapter. (Source from IDAM) 
B. DEFINITION OF PROGRAM MANAGEMENT  
The US defines Program Management as a process whereby a single leader exercises 
authority and responsibility for planning, organizing, staffing, controlling, and leading the 
combined efforts of participating/assigned civilian and military personnel and organizations, for 
the management of a specific Defense acquisition program or programs, through development, 
production, deployment, operations, support, and disposal. 
In the concept of the new Defense systems, integrated products and process development 
are managed using Program Managers and multidisciplinary teams called “Integrated Product 
Teams.” Hand in hand, these key DoD acquisition system personnel work parallel with the 
Defense industry, which operates and staffs their program office similar to the government they 
support. (Source IDAM) 
C. KEY PLAYERS IN THE DEFENSE ACQUISITION PROGRAM 
In 1986, President Reagan approved and implemented a streamlined reporting chain, 
from program managers of major Defense Acquisition Programs to the top-level executive. This 
Defense acquisition system resulted from a comprehensive review conducted by the former 
Deputy Secretary of Defense, David Packard, creating a single top-level Defense Acquisition 
Executive responsible for the Defense Acquisition process.  
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In 1989, President Bush reemphasized the Packard Commission review and further 
reinforced the importance of the streamlined reporting chain for all program managers. He 
stipulated that the reporting chain include no more than two levels of management oversight 
between program manager and the milestone decision authority for all acquisition programs. 
This structure provides a clear line of authority, running from the USD (AT&L), through the 
Component Acquisition Executives and Program Executive Officers, to the individual program 
managers of ACAT ID programs. In ACAT IAM programs, it is the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense who serves as the milestone decision authority. The reporting structure for ACAT ID 
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Figure 4-1 US DoD Acquisition Authority Chain (From Ref. 20) 
 
1. Program Manager  
Program Manager is broadly used in the Defense Acquisition system, and it assumes 
different meanings depending on the branch of service. It can be Program Manager, Product 
Manager or Project Manager, but the role it takes is similar in the all the activities surrounding 
the acquisition process. 
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To be effective, the PM should be knowledgeable about all project activities, including 
their complex interrelationships. The following roles and functions will generally describe how 
program managers work in the system: (Source Introduction to Defense Acquisition 
Management 2001) 
a. A  leader and a manager, not primarily a task “doer;” 
b. Understands the requirements, environmental factors, organizations, activities, 
constraints, risks, and motivations impacting the program; 
c. Knows and is capable of working within the established framework, managerial 
systems, and processes that provide funding and other decisions for the program to proceed; 
d. Comprehends and puts to use the basic skills of management - planning, 
organizing, staffing, leading, and controlling — so people and systems harmonize to produce the 
desired results; 
e. Coordinates the work of Defense industry contractors, consultants, in-house 
engineers and logisticians, contracting officers, and others, whether assigned directly to the 
program office or supporting it through some form of integrated product team or matrix support 
arrangement; 
f. Builds support for the program and monitors reactions and perceptions, which 
help or impede progress; 
g. Serves both the military needs of the user in the field and the priority and funding 
constraints imposed by managers in the Pentagon and military service/Defense agency 
headquarters. 
The figure below describes a broader perspective of how the PM works with the different 
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Figure 4-2 Program Manager’s Environment (From Ref. 20) 
 
2.    Integrated Product Teams 
Integrated Product Teams involve representatives from all appropriate functional 
disciplines, both in Government and the system/subsystem contractors who support the Program 
or Program Manager. These are key personnel who work together with a Team Leader. They 
exist to build successful and balanced programs, identify and resolve issues, and make sound and 
timely decisions. Members of an IPT are not limited to one area in the project alone. They could 
be assigned to several IPTs in the program. An IPT may be an overarching IPT (OIPT), a 
working IPT (WIPT) or integrated IPT (IIPT) 
IPTs make team decisions based on inputs from the entire team in the areas of program 
management, engineering, manufacturing, test, logistics, financial management, procurement, 
and contract administration, including customers and suppliers. A typical IPT composition at the 
program level may include the following functional disciplines: design engineering, 
manufacturing, systems engineering, test and evaluation, subcontracting, safety and HAZMAT, 
quality assurance, training, finance, reliability, maintainability, and supportability, procurement, 
and contract administration for suppliers and customers. 
3. Characteristics of an IPT 
The two most important characteristics of a successful IPT are the following: 
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a. Cooperation 
  An IPT must maintain an atmosphere where discussions are laid open without 
secrets. All facts need to be on the table for each team member to understand and assess. Each 
member possesses a unique expertise apart from the other, so all views have to be considered and 
heard, but not necessarily acted upon. Several differences might crop up in the course of their 
discussions, however, these disagreements must be reasoned based on an action rather than 
unyielding opposition. Issues have to be resolved early so that resolutions can be achieved at the 
earliest possible time and at the appropriate level. 
b. Empowerment  
 Empowerment is critical. The functional representatives assigned to the IPT at all 
levels must be empowered by their leadership to give good advice and counsel to the Program 
Manager. They must be able to speak for their superiors, the principals, in the decision-making 
process. IPT members cannot be expected to have the breadth of knowledge and experience of 
their leadership in all cases. However, they are expected to be in frequent communication with 
their leadership, and thus ensure that their advice to the Program Manager is sound and will not 
be overturned later, barring unforeseen circumstances or new information. One of the key 
responsibilities of program leaders is to train and educate their people so they will have the 
knowledge and skills to represent their organizations’ leaders. IPT members are extensions of 
their organizations and leadership; they must be able to speak for those organizations and 
leaders. 
c. Responsibilities 
• May operate as an entity or be organized into sub-IPTs or Product Teams to develop,  
procure, and deliver products or services for users or customers.  
• Manages each program's Acquisition Program Baseline and predicts and reports potential  
breaches to management.  
• Develops and obtains team member endorsement of the Acquisition Strategy Paper.  
• Develops and obtains team member endorsement of the Integrated Program Plan.  
• Assists in developing  the Requirements Document.  
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• Develops cost and schedule baselines for candidate solutions during Investment Analysis.  
• Acquires new or improved capability for services and products throughout their lifecycle.  
• Obtains and coordinates input from subject matter experts in critical functional 
disciplines.  
These disciplines vary, depending on the type of program, but typically include: 
requirement management; test and evaluation; deployment planning; logistics support; 
procurement planning; real property; acquisition, management, and disposal; configuration 
management; human factors; environmental, occupational safety and health, and energy 
considerations; information technology; systems engineering; security; system safety 
management; spectrum management; risk management; regulation and certification; 
telecommunications. The IPT is responsible for ensuring that all relevant disciplines have been 
contacted, whether or not they appear in the above list.    
4. Overarching Integrated Product Team (OIPT)  
Because of the benefits realized from working as integrated teams, IPTs have extended to 
management levels above the program manager. These teams are known as overarching IPTs 
(OIPTs) and provide expertise to help program managers build balanced programs, resolve 
issues early in the process, and more efficiently prepare for program milestone reviews. In this 
oversight and review process, OIPTs are structured differently from the cross-functional, 
horizontally integrated teams used by program managers.  OIPTs are vertically integrated with 
membership drawn from senior level representatives for various staff and line levels.  
The Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) establishes the OIPT and designates a 
chairperson. The MDA identifies the OIPT secretary/facilitator and appoints the OIPT 
membership. Membership is tailored to the needs and level of oversight required for the 
program.  
a. Responsibilities 
• Meet regularly with the PM to raise and resolve program and project management 
issues.  
• Provide recommendations for tailoring and streamlining the program.  
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• Vertically link with the PMs working level IPT.  
• Help the PM successfully achieve a milestone decision.  
• Develop a memorandum documenting the issues and risks to be raised to the 
MDA.  
• Recommend to the MDA when an IPR (Interim Program Review) needs to be 
convened.  
• Provide an independent assessment for the MDA in preparation for the MDR.  
5.  Working Level Integrated Teams   
These are teams formed at the Pentagon-level military department headquarters. They 
meet as required to help the program manager plan program structure and documentation, and 
resolve issues. The leader of each WIPT is usually the Program Manager or the PM’s 
representative. WIPTs adhere to three basic tenets: 
• The Program manager is in charge of the program 
• WIPTs are advisory bodies to the PM 
• Direct communication between the program office and all levels in the acquisition  
oversight and review process is expected to exchange information and build trust. 
D. ACQUISITION MANAGEMENT SYSTEM  
The DoD Acquisition Management System is governed by three key documents, which 
serve as guides to the defense acquisition business. The first is DoD Directive 5000.1, the 
Defense Acquisition System, which provides broad policy and principles for all acquisition 
programs. It also identifies the key officials and panels for managing the system. DoD Directive 
5000.2, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System, establishes the framework for translating 
mission needs into stable, affordable, and well-managed acquisition programs. The other 
regulation is DoDR 5000.2, Mandatory Procedure for Major Defense Acquisition Programs 
(MDAPS) and Major Automated Information System Acquisition Programs (MAIS). 5000.2-R 
provides detailed policies and procedures to guide development and production in major DoD 
programs. 
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 These three documents have recently been cancelled and replaced by an interim 
guidance issued by the Deputy Secretary of Defense (DUSD), Paul Wolfowitz, on October 30, 
2002. The interim guideline is to rapidly deliver affordable, sustainable capability that meets the 
war fighter’s needs by creating an acquisition policy environment that fosters efficiency, 
flexibility, creativity and innovation. Essentially, the interim guidelines establish a simplified and 
flexible approach for managing acquisition programs and provide a simplified and flexible 
management framework for translating mission needs.  
The four phases in the current US DoD Acquisition System are: (1) Concept and 
Technology Development; (2) System Development and Demonstration; (3) Production and 
Deployment; and (4) Operations and Support. As the program advances through these phases, it 
must pass Milestone Decision Points (Milestone A to C). At every milestone, the Milestone 
Decision Authority (MDA) will determine whether the system is programmatically and 
technologically ready for the next phase. For Major Defense Acquisitions, the Defense 
Acquisition Board (DAB) is the MDA.  
One primary difference between the current and previous systems is that the program can 
enter acquisition at any decision point or phase, provided that the stated entrance criteria are 
satisfied. Another is that the emphasis is now on evolutionary developments where the major 
consideration is the maturity of the technology so that the system can be delivered to the war 
fighters as fast as possible. The system is then further developed in blocks as technology 
matures. Figure 3-10 shows the Defense Acquisition Management Framework for Major 
Programs.  
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Figure 4-3 US DoD Acquisition Management Framework 
                       From Operation of the Defense Acquisition System (From Ref. 12) 
 
E.  SUMMARY 
This chapter describes US Acquisition Management and the key players’ chain of 
authority, particularly the Program Managers and IPTs. It also presented the roles, characteristics 
and responsibilities of the PMs and the different IPTs involved in the acquisition process, and the 
extent of their authority.  
The following chapter will compare and contrast the PMs and PMTs of the Philippines 
Armed Forces with the US Armed Forces’ PMs and IPTs, to analyze and present a framework 
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 V.   DISCUSSION AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In the AFP acquisition process, service designated PMs and PMTs formulate the Circular 
of Requirements needed for a weapon system during operational utilization. Nowhere is cost and 
schedule part of PM and PMT planning.  Cost of a potential program is pre-determined by higher 
management planners without specialized knowledge of service requirements and system 
operational use. Schedule basically depends on whether or not the system will be approved for 
acquisition. Approval for acquisition only comes after a long and sequential acquisition process 
paved with political, economic, and leadership obstacles in decision-making. As for 
performance, PM and PMT may be able to formulate the required document - Circular of 
Requirements and Bid Evaluation Plan - for the service required weapon system, however, 
performance criteria will always be made at minimum levels: formulating minimal requirements 
is inevitable because PM and PMT lack knowledge about present day technologies and costs for 
such technologies.  
In the AFP, PM and PMT have no real contacts, informative or negotiative, with potential 
contractors and their products. Contracts are established or negotiated at either the Department or 
Higher Headquarters level. This predicament, which comprises leverage with the defense 
industries, will have a high-risk impact in the acquisition process, possibly increasing the 
acquisition time of a system. In the Philippine Budget and Fiscal policies, authorization funding 
has a limited lifespan to promote optimal use of the scarce and limited financial resources 
available.  There were past incidents where funds were not used for a given program due to 
delays in the acquisition process, and the funds reverted back to government coffers. Delays in 
the acquisition process are often caused by delays in decision-making and in the documentation 
and sequential processing of transactions by various functional agencies. The agencies frequently 
fail to appreciate the ultimate impact these transactions have on the service requiring the system 
in particular, and AFP in general. The foregone funds reflect an alarming culture of inefficiency, 
a lack of acquisition experience, and even mismanagement. Overall, such experience proves 
costly in terms of opportunity cost. 
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The culture of inefficiency refers to the AFP leadership’s complacency in making 
improvements in its processes, such as the acquisition process. Processes in place in the past 
have grown to be accepted as the norm, though there are strong justifications for overhauling the 
process.  A classic example is that the approving authority for financial transactions remains at 
the price level that applied to transactions in the 1970s. As a result, contracts are “split” to 
accommodate purchases exceeding the approval authority. As a consequence, regular audits 
paint a negative image of Commands that venture into such contracts.  
The lack of acquisition experience refers to the AFP’s lack of exposure to major systems 
acquisitions. In the past, the AFP depended on the US for its operational requirements through 
Foreign Military Sales.  The AFP received military hardware from the US and optimized what 
was on hand to address its mission. Little did the AFP realize at that time, that the organization 
needs a pool of manpower that are adept in both major and minor acquisition programs.  
Mismanagement in the AFP acquisition process refers to an inadequate organizational 
strategy to determine and guide its structure and capability. Requirements identified by services, 
and even by the AFP, depend heavily on the current leadership – what the leader desires is what 
everyone wants. Unfortunately, leadership tenure in the AFP is measured in months and not 
years. Mismanagement in acquiring organizational requirements is still very evident in the 
present Modernization Acquisition Process – evident in the long, sequential, time consuming and 
position (egotistic) driven process, which is centralized in Higher Headquarters. While the 
process may be interpreted as providing checks and balances by Central Authority over the major 
service’s programs, in essence the process paints a picture of mistrust, and competition among 
the major services, with GHQ jumping into the fray for control and a bigger modernization 
budget, and a lack of accountability on the part of the service acquiring the system.  
Under these uncertain organizational structures and functions, and inadequate standards 
in the modernization program’s acquisition process, Program Managers and Project Management 
Teams must play a critical role in expeditiously facilitating systems acquisition. With the PM 
and PMT background in formulating the COR and BEP, the PM and PMT’s roles, functions, and 
organizational position in the overall process could become the central focus for decision making 
from requirement generation through contract negotiation, implementing an approved contract, 
test and evaluation, deployment, sustaining employment, and ultimately to disposal. 
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B.       COMPARISON PM AND PMT ROLE THE ACQUISITION PROCESS  
(Armed Forces Of The Philippines And The United States Department Of Defense) 
 
1. Similarities in the Role of the Program Managers 
Program Managers in the US DoD represent a single leader that exercises centralized 
authority and responsibility for planning, organizing, staffing, controlling, and leading the 
combined efforts of participating civilian and military personnel and organizations, to manage a 
specific Defense acquisition program or programs, through development, production, 
deployment, operations, support, and disposal.  
On the other hand, Program Managers in the AFP represent a field grade officer 
designated by his respective branch of service to head a team of designated officers, from various 
disciplines or functional specialties, and formulate a Circular of Requirement and Bid Evaluation 
Plan for weapons systems being considered as part of the AFP Modernization Program. Hence, 
the only common aspect of Program Managers in both organizations is their planning task; and 
planning is limited for the AFP PM – develop a list of minimum criteria and sub-systems, 
required by the organization from a weapon system, either available in the market or being 
conceptualized for future production, subject to demand – and in production. In the AFP’s case, 
production means the actual acquisition and transfer of ownership- from contractors to the AFP, 
of a weapon system. 
2. Differences in the Role of the Program Managers 
Since the only common aspect of Program Managers across the AFP and the US DoD is 
planning, though limited for the AFP, and production, also limited to actual acquisition (an 
equivalent of procurement), there is a huge difference in the role of PM in both organizations.  
In the US DoD, Program Managers are the central figures in the acquisition process. 
They exercise centralized authority and responsibility for their particular program. In consonance 
with such authority, they are responsible for planning, organizing, staffing, controlling, and 
leading the combined efforts of all cognizant sectors for managing a specific Defense acquisition 
program or programs. In order to accomplish this, the PM manages the development, production, 
deployment, operations, support, and even the disposal of that given system. 
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On the other hand, Program Managers in the AFP Acquisition Process are typically staff 
officers tasked to draft a plan – the COR and BEP. Their role in the acquisition process ends 
when they have generated the COR and BEP, which the Major Service approves and endorses to 
Higher Authorities. After the COR and BEP have been made an effective basis for the 
acquisition of the needed system and there is appropriate approval for purchasing the system, the 
Program Manager’s role is again resurrected to help implement the acquisition contract. At this 
stage, the Program Manager may have no grasp as to what the COR and BEP of the system went 
through – have there been any changes in the requirement, what are the costs for such changes – 
operationally, logistically and financially. The PM doesn’t know which contractors participated 
in the bidding process, who won the contract, and who are the contact persons, among other 
questions. Here lies one of the dilemmas of the Program Manager in the AFP.  
3. Similarities in the Role of the IPTs and PMTs 
In the US DoD setting, an Integrated Product Team (IPT) consists of key personnel from 
a variety of functional areas who support the Program or Project Manager (PM) of a System 
investment. The IPT draws upon the necessary functional activities for specific expertise to 
accomplish its goals. IPT Membership typically includes, but is not limited to, milestone In-
Process Review (IPR) members and the internal support that provides vital functional or 
technical expertise to make a program successful (e.g., project leaders, logisticians, contract 
procurement representative, business manager, and human resources representatives). Core 
personnel may also act as Integrated Product Team Leaders for their assigned products.  
IPT members receive programmatic direction from the PM leader and supervision from 
their functional manager. The IPT member responds to day-to-day direction from the IPT leader 
in contributing to work objectives. Meanwhile, the IPT member is obligated to remain in contact 
with his or her functional manager to stay current with functional policies, directives and lessons 
learned.  
PMs are expected to delegate limited program/product decision authority to the IPTs in 
consonance with PM direction and guidance, and allow them to manage their assigned products 
or program. While team members are empowered to achieve their goals, the PM is ultimately 
responsible for the program and product quality. Team members are the PM’s advisors. It is their 
responsibility to show that their solutions represent best value.  
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In the AFP, Major Service PMT are composed mostly of field grade and company grade 
officers who, to some degree of knowledge and specialization, are credible in formulating 
operational criteria requirements for a needed system. Major Service PMTs also include staff 
members from functional divisions to assist in formulating the BEP. At the higher headquarters 
level, another PMT, organized by the AFPMO, also includes various field grade officers and 
technical personnel, such as lawyers and accountants. Unlike its counterpart at the Major 
Services, the latter is tasked to consolidate the COR and BEP of all Major Services and evaluate 
the submitted documents to look into the general bidding, financial and negotiation requirements 
to make these documents a basis for system acquisition.  The former have operational and 
limited functional expertise while the latter have more functional expertise. 
Both PMT for AFP and IPT for US DoD have recognized and adopted the Integrated 
Product and Process Development (IPPD) management framework, which focuses on 
Cooperation and Empowerment. IPPD is a management technique that simultaneously integrates 
all essential acquisition activities through multidisciplinary teams to optimize the design, 
manufacturing and supportability processes. IPPD facilitates meeting cost and performance 
objectives from product concept through production, including field support. One of the key 
IPPD tenets (all of which are described in attachment 2) is multidisciplinary teamwork through 
Integrated Product Teams (IPTs). These teams help make the right decisions at the right time. 
Unfortunately for the AFP, empowerment under this management technique is just a concept, 
because AFP leadership culture, most often, overturns the PMT decisions.  
4. Differences in the Role of the IPTs and PMTs 
Just as there are similarities between IPT and PMT, there are also differences. For one, 
US DoD IPT in consultation with system end-users, has been empowered to make decisions that 
are, most often, respected as binding in the overall program. Decisions by an AFP PMT are 
considered as recommendations or advisory in nature. US DoD IPT membership may be a 
collateral duty, however, membership tends to be relatively permanent to assure program 
continuity. In the AFP, membership to PMT is also a collateral duty, but more temporary in 
nature. Upon completing the COR and BEP, the PMT is generally dissolved because they have 
completed their PMT task. During the acquisition process, US DoD IPTs closely monitor the 
system acquisition process from “womb to tomb”. PMT, on the other hand, monitors the system 
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during planning and actual acquisition, only through contract implementation, and does not 
monitor its actual deployment, sustainment in operation or disposal. 
5.      Organizational Position of PM and PMT in Acquisition Process Structure of   
           the Armed Forces of the Philippines 
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Figure 5-1 AFP Acquisition Process (From Ref. 12) 
As shown in the above diagram, Program Managers and Program Management Teams 
have very limited roles, functions and responsibilities in system acquisition under the AFP 
Modernization Program. Their role is at the extreme of the spectrum in the acquisition process. 
6. Program Structure of the United States Department of Defense 
Looking at the US DoD structure indicates that the US DoD has acknowledged the 
importance of the PM and IPT in the acquisition process. The institution not only acknowledges 

























































Figure 5-2 US Program Manager’s Environment (From Ref. 20) 
 
C.         SUMMARY  
From this chapter, it can be emphasized that the role of PM and PMT in the system 
acquisition process is important for the overall organization. In the US DoD model, the PM and 
IPT are the hub from which all efforts – planning, coordination, production, etc., emanate. PMs 
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VI.  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION  
The Armed Forces of the Philippines is currently reforming its acquisition process and, as 
such, it is not yet considered mature. It is still in its infancy. Changes have to be made and the 
office in charge of acquisition is looking for ways to incorporate modern management techniques 
into the process. Studies made by NPS students have contributed considerably to its 
improvement and as an encouragement to this effort, our thesis will continue to impact change, 
especially in the area of managing acquired weapon system. PMs and PMTs will facilitate the 
early deployment of an acquired weapon system if the US DoD acquisition management system 
is used as benchmark in formulating a framework that is best fitted to the AFP acquisition. 
This chapter presents the findings and recommendations of our research. The study has 
provided information and understanding of the AFP Modernization Program and the associated 
laws, rules and regulations. Chapter III reviewed the role, function and importance of Program 
Managers and Program Management Teams in the acquisition systems of the Armed Forces of 
the Philippines. Chapter IV compared the AFP and US Department of Defense Acquisition 
structures. The analytical comparison of both structures pertaining to PM and PMT was made in 
Chapter V.  
Chapter V presented the role, function and importance of PM and PMT in the acquisition 
process for the AFPMP in order to effectively manage the weapon system acquisition and to 
establish an integrated, logical, systematic and time efficient approach to address the defense 
needs or requirement. With the consolidation of the knowledge achieved from the research, this 
study in now presenting its conclusions and recommendations. 
 After careful and thorough comparison and evaluation, this thesis will present 
alternatives to ensure an effective and efficient project management by modifying the current 
role and function of AFP PMs and PMTs in the acquisition process. 
B. CONCLUSIONS  
The success of any system requirement acquisition depends on the person or group of 
people that manage the program from requirement conception to acquisition processes and 
system deployment to the termination of system utilization within the organization. By 
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establishing a core of qualified and accountable personnel, working within the boundaries of the 
organization’s strategic and tactical needs, any project is guaranteed supervision. Currently, 
however, the PM and PMT structure, role and function under the AFPMP lacks authority to 
supervise any project in all phases of the acquisition process or project life cycle. 
Based on the data and information presented, analyzed and interpreted in the preceding 
chapters, following are the conclusions of the study:  
1. The AFP has a limited understanding of the importance of the PM and PMT in 
any system acquisition endeavor. It has a constrained regulation that deals with the role and 
function of PM and PMT in any or all types of projects.  
2.  The AFP acquisition planning is done in a fragmented and personality-driven 
manner. The elements of an acquisition plan are prepared by the PMTs but not as parts of an 
overall plan which establishes a logical and systematic approach to addressing an AFP 
requirement. Contract administration, for example, is not being addressed in the planning 
documents and this is a subject of two previous theses by Filipino officers at the Naval 
Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. 
3.  There is a lack of educated, trained and qualified personnel for designation as 
either Program Managers or members of Project Management Teams. Presently, there are only 
three graduates of acquisition and contracting and no graduates of system acquisition 
management in the AFP. Training of project team members may be a continuing activity in the 
AFP to specifically address the need. However, most often, such training is done through 
classroom type seminars and lectures and no efforts are being made for these students to apply 
what they learn. Eventually, most of the graduates of these short courses are not designated to 
membership of any PMT in the various service PMTs.  
4.  There is no dedicated defense acquisition organization that is responsible for 
defense acquisitions. The SND is most often the milestone decision authority and this impedes 
efficiency. Having a DND acquisition organization would provide a structure that would lead to 
the establishment and better management of the acquisition systems and processes in relation to 
the AFP and service pursuit of projects under the AFPMP.  
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5.  There is still no established education and training program within the Philippine 
defense establishment that addresses the skill requirements necessary for acquisition personnel to 
successfully pursue weapon systems acquisitions in the AFP. Thus, planning remains 
fragmented, and acquisition and development plans constantly change depending on what the 
incumbent leaders’ desire. System acquisition or development plans are sporadically prepared.  
6.  PMT membership is designed to be a primary duty. However, in actuality, it is 
handled as a collateral duty. This affects the preparation and development of the CORs, BEPs, 
and other attendant plans for identified projects.  Most often, documents are not conclusive to an 
appropriate degree of finality, because they are not a product of a cohesive group – a group that 
feels they are part of something important, a group that feels that they can make a difference, a 
group that can be considered a real team. 
 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS  
In view of the above, the following recommendations are provided:  
1.  Revise the current IGRR to establish Program Managers and Project Management 
Team roles and functions in the overall acquisition process, including conducting acquisition 
planning and preparing acquisition plans, as a requirement for all defense acquisition programs. 
With an established and formalized policy and procedures, PM and PMT would be more 
effective in addressing and managing the systems to be acquired under the AFPMP.  
2.  Institute formalized and structured education and training programs in the AFP to 
address the skill requirements for AFP weapon system acquisitions. With the acquisition process 
still evolving, personnel projected for positions as Program Managers and members of PMT 
should be assigned to minor projects, projects not necessarily defense-related per se, for 
exposure and confidence building.  
3.  The DND should establish a defense acquisition organization responsible for all 
acquisitions of the defense department, not only for the AFP Modernization Program.  
4.  Properly implement and manage the Program Managers and Project Management 
Teams. Program Managers and Team members are supposed to be on detached service to the 
major service modernization office, and assume major responsibility. With established and 
formalized policies and procedures, they should perform their primary job as PM and PMT 
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members and not perform other collateral duties. Major Service commands must ensure 
compliance to policy and procedures with regard to duties as PM and PMT members.  
5.  Through changes in policy and procedures and strict implementation of the same, 
expand the role and function of Program Managers and Project Management Teams in the 
overall acquisition process. Implement the US Project Management Model in the AFP 
acquisition process by critically acknowledging the PM and PMT role is important in the life of 
any weapon system to be acquired under the AFPMP. Figure 6-1, which reproduces figure 5-2, is 


























































Figure 6-1 AFP Program Manager’s Environment (After Ref. 12) 
 
In the above model, the PM and PMT roles and functions are emphasized at all levels of 
the acquisition process. This is illustrated in Figures 6-2 and 6-3. 
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MODIFIED AFP ACQUISITION PROCESS
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Figure 6-2 Modified AFP Acquisition Process (After Ref. 12) 
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Figure 6-3 Modified AFP Acquisition Process (After Ref. 12) 
D. SUMMARY AND REVIEW OF RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
1. Primary Research Question 
Can the organization and management of Program Managers and Program Management 
Teams in the AFP modernization program acquisition process be improved using the US DoD 
acquisition model as a frame of reference? 
Any organizational structure or management process, as a general rule for survival and 
effectiveness, should be open to change. The AFP organization as a whole, including its various 
sub-organizations, and the current management systems or processes, is not exempt from the 
need to improve. The AFP should re-engineer its organization and processes to ensure optimal 
utilization and results at minimum cost.  Minimizing total ownership cost is particularly critical 
considering that the Philippine Government has limited funding to address the AFP requirement 
to modernize its forces and capability. 
Knowing that the AFP is new to major defense system acquisitions and system 
acquisition organizations, and with a limited pool of personnel experienced with the new 
structure and processes, the AFP should consider other structures and processes to learn from 
and adopt. The successful and time-tested US DoD acquisition structure and processes have 
always been respectfully regarded by the AFP as credible and highly informative benchmarks.  
Using the US DoD acquisition organization and system as a frame of reference for 
improvement provides the AFP several advantages: 
1. The Philippine Government, the Defense Institution, and the AFP organization 
structure and functions are similar to the US. However, the US Defense structure and processes 
have evolved over time, depending on US strategic policies – both defense-related and reflecting 
the global environment; the AFP organization and processes have remained relatively 
unchanged.  
2. The US weapon systems acquisition process has always been considered by the 
world in general, and the Philippines in particular, as the standard to which other countries 
compare themselves.  
3. Defense cooperation between the US and the Philippines - sharing of information, 
organizational structures, policies, procedures, and even systems - could facilitate expeditious 
changes or adjustments in the AFP organization’s framework and processes. 
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4. The majority of weapon systems being acquired by the AFP, and even those that 
exist in its inventory, are supplied by US Defense providers. Hence, compatibility in structure 
and processes would ensure resource providers an effective system. 
Because the AFP recognizes the need to improve itself, it is reasonable that the AFP look 
to the US Acquisition Model as a possibility for adoption. This would, of course, include 
adopting the US Project Management Model, which highlights the importance of PM, and PMT 
to the success of any given major and minor defense programs and projects. 
2. First Subsidiary Question 
Is the current acquisition process of the Armed Forces of the Philippines customer 
(defense requirement providers) friendly and responsive? 
No. The lengthy and sequential acquisition process, aggravated by an acquisition 
Program that is personality driven and a structured vertical hierarchy for decision-making, does 
not promote or encourage defense resource providers to invest in the program. In its present 
structure, decision-makers may have the privilege of interacting with the defense resource 
providers, however, the people in the organization who have technical and operational 
knowledge of the requirement have limited interactions with their counterparts in the industry. 
The structure poses a problem in the long run, where constant changes in the requirement are 
possible. Changes in requirements will not only hamper the project, but will involve financial 
losses to the government in general and operational opportunity costs to the organization. 
3. Second Subsidiary Question 
Is there a need to reengineer the acquisition process to expand the area of responsibility 
of the program managers and program management teams of the Armed Forces of the 
Philippines? 
Yes. In the US, the Program Managers are the individuals responsible for the 
development and delivery schedules, and ensuring weapon systems perform as required. The 
PMs are responsible for program costs, schedule, technical performance, and supportability. 
They are also responsible for developing an acquisition strategy, planning the program by 
developing a management approach, providing budgetary estimates and alternatives, developing 
contract strategies, and conducting day-to-day program management.   
Under the current system, the AFP’s PMs and PMTs meet none of the above roles. The 
acquisition division of the AFP is J-9 and performs contract-processing functions. There is no 
49
way for a PM or PMTs to monitor the life cycle of a weapon system. One reason for this could 
be the organizational framework and the lack of trained and efficient acquisition personnel. 
Another would be the lack of budget for developing acquired systems, in which case, acquisition 
becomes merely procuring over-the-counter items.  It is apparent that life cycle management is 
not viewed as important, and therefore not practiced in the AFP. As a result, some units do not 
have the equipment needed to accomplish their missions. Instead, they have equipment that is 
more suitable for a museum or is low enough in quality that it endangers and costs soldiers lives.  
Like the armed forces of any developing country, the AFP must compete against other 
government agencies for scarce resources. The country’s current economic conditions constrain 
the AFP budget, which must be faced by using innovative solutions that are within the legal 
framework. Defense spending has become a low priority among the political leadership. In 1995, 
when the Modernization office was created, it was supposed to have received 50 billion pesos for 
its first five-year modernization plan.  But, as expected, the office received only a minimal 5 
billion and has not been provided additional funding since the last release in 2000. The AFP’s 
precarious financial situation has forced the high command to limit military acquisitions to the 
minimum. Lack of equipment renewal negatively affects national security because the AFP has 
limited training and usage to prolong and avoid excessive wear and tear of the existing 
equipment. The approach taken by the AFP’s high command is not totally congruent with their 
responsibility to provide the units with the means to accomplish their missions. The answer to 
this problem is not to minimize equipment acquisition or maintain legacy equipment, but rather 
improve the process to clearly maximize cost effective modernization and prioritize system 
acquisition to maximize the effectiveness of the AFP. 
The DND, on the other hand, must have a mechanism that ensures optimal resource 
usage, and limits fraud, waste, and abuse in acquisition funding. In the current system, limited 
monitoring and control over the process invites graft and corruption. The acquisition process 
must facilitate monitoring and control during all phases of the life cycle. This existing linear 
management technique lacks feedback, thus the high command does not know if a newly 
acquired system is delivered, used, maintained, or functioning properly for its intended purpose. 
If the AFP continues to follow the current acquisition system, it will fail to provide adequate 
equipment for its units. 
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4. Third Subsidiary Question 
Are the program managers and program management teams effective and efficient in the 
current acquisition process of the Armed Forces of the Philippines? 
The current acquisition process makes the PMs and PMTs in the AFP neither effective 
nor efficient, given the new environment of the AFP Modernization office. The SND and GHQ 
is very centralized and has become increasingly influential. This trend will continue as the 
acquisition process matures. The acquisition process was designed to establish PMs and PMTs 
procurement officers, and their roles do not include participating in the entire life cycle of the 
system.  
5. Fourth Subsidiary Question 
Are the strengths and weaknesses of the program managers and program management 
teams in both countries determinable and comparable? 
Yes, as discussed in the preceding chapter, strengths and weaknesses of the role and 
functions of program managers and project management team for the US and AFP model may be 
determined and compared. 
For the US, the PM and IPT are the central core of any system or project acquisition 
process. All activities relevant to the project are managed by the PM and PMT through the IPPD 
process. However, in the case of the AFP, the PM and PMT roles and functions are restricted to 
system requirement generation, in the first phase of the program, and to implementing the project 
acquisition in its final phase. 
For the US model, the PM and IPT have decision making authority. This is unlike the 
AFP model, where the PM and PMT are limited to a recommendatory role. This decision-making 
authority depends on the organizational structure of the defense establishment. The US has a flat 
structure for its acquisition process while the AFP has a highly centralized and vertical hierarchy. 
6. Fifth Subsidiary Question 
What would be the advantages and disadvantages of applying the US acquisition model 
to the Armed Forces of the Philippines? 
Advantages: 
1. Using the U.S. PM and PMT to ensure technically and operationally credible 
organizational system requirements reduces if not eliminates design changes in the latter part of 
the acquisition process. 
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2. The U.S. guaranteed model supervision, under the cloak of accountability, and 
close management of a project in all phases of the acquisition process.  
3. The structure guarantees that the project or system being acquired is based on 
established strategic plan, executed by acquisition professionals throughout the life cycle.  
 4. Because projects are, in principle, approved based on oversight and strategic 
guidance from concerned departments and agencies, civilian and defense organization, projects 
through supervision and monitoring of PM and PMT expeditiously go through the acquisition 
process. 
Disadvantages: 
1. Overhauling the organizational structure and processes, and patterning it after the 
US model, will entail cost, both monetary and in terms of the time already invested in the current 
structure. 
2. Complexity of the US Acquisition model, being a new process for the AFP, might 
result in management problems in personnel and structure. As it is, the AFP lacks qualified 
personnel to adopt and implement the US system. The US model relies on a flat acquisition 
system with approving authority is vested with a lower lever authority – e.g., US Department of 
the Navy, an equivalent of the Branch of Service for the AFP. Meanwhile, the AFP has a highly 
centralized acquisition structure, with decision authority resting at the AFB command level.  
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APPENDIX  - DEFINITIONS, ABBREVIATIONS, AND ACRONYMS 
For purposes of clarity and better understanding, the terms below are offered with their 
corresponding definitions or meaning:  
Acquisition - includes design, engineering, test and evaluation, production, and 
operations and support of Defense systems. As used herein, the term “Defense acquisition” 
generally applies only to weapons and information technology systems, processes, procedures 
and end products. 
Acquisition Plan - a formal written document reflecting the specific actions necessary to 
execute the approach established in the approved acquisition strategy and guide contractual 
implementation.  
Acquisition Executive - the individual within the Department and Services charged with 
overall acquisition management responsibilities within his or her respective organization. 
Acquisition Planning - the process by which the efforts of all personnel responsible for 
an acquisition are coordinated and integrated through a comprehensive plan for fulfilling the 
agency need in a timely manner and at a reasonable cost. It is performed throughout the life cycle 
and includes developing an overall acquisition strategy for managing the acquisition and a 
written acquisition plan.  
Acquisition Programs - are directed and funded efforts designed to provide a new, 
improved, or continuing materiel, weapon or information system capability or service in 
response to a validated operational or business need. 
AFP – Armed Forces of the Philippines  
AFP Modernization Act - refers to Republic Act No. 7898, which was enacted into law 
on 23 February 1995.  
AFP Modernization Program or AFPMP - refers to the modernization program 
submitted by the President of the Philippines pursuant to Section 7 of the AFP Modernization 
Act and approved by Congress through Joint Resolution No. 28, dated 19 December 1996.  
AFP Modernization Act Trust Fund or AFPMATF - refers to the trust fund created 
under Section 11 of the AFP Modernization Act.  
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Automated Information Systems - are usually associated with performing routine 
administrative and business tasks, such as payroll and accounting functions. 
Bids and Awards Committees (BAC) - these are the committees constituted at AFP 
General Headquarters (GHQ) that conduct the public bidding and contract negotiations for 
equipment acquisition projects under the AFPMP. Their tasks start from the time the Chief of 
Staff, AFP receives the Secretary of National Defense (SND) directive to undertake bidding and 
negotiations for a specified project or projects, to the approval of the formal contractual 
agreement by the SND.  
Bid and Evaluation Plan or BEP - a comprehensive document that contains the 
procedures for acquiring equipment or weapon systems, indicating the method of procurement, 
pre-qualification of bidders and the bidding process up to and including the contract award. 
Circular of Requirements or COR - a document that defines the operational and 
technical requirement of the equipment or weapons systems to be procured. It is presented in the 
context of the national defense strategy, the likely operational scenarios and the doctrines or 
concept of operations in which such equipment or weapons system shall be employed. It likewise 
includes, as applicable, force restructuring, human resource development, base development and 
other support requirements. If the equipment is part of a systems-mix, this concept of systems-
mix is also stated. Similarly, in the case of equipment or weapon systems, which have to be 
operationally inter-phased or integrated with civilian agencies of the government, the concept of 
inter-phase or integration shall be incorporated.  
Contract - the agreement entered into and between two or more parties, signed by the 
parties, including all attachments and appendices thereto and all documents incorporated by 
reference therein.  
Equipment Acquisition - the first stage in the procedure for acquiring equipment and 
weapons systems under the capability, materiel and technology development component of the 
AFPMP. It includes formulating the COR and preparing the Bid Evaluation Plan (BEP).  
Implementing Guidelines, Rules and Regulations or IGRR - refers to the guidelines, 
rules and regulations prescribed in DND Circular No. 1.  
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Information Technology Systems - includes both National Security Systems and 
Automated Information Systems.  
Management - includes a set of tasks required to accomplish a specified project. 
National Security Systems - used for intelligence and cryptology activities and command 
and control of military forces, or are integral to a weapons system, or critical to the direct 
fulfillment of a military or intelligence mission.  
Procurement - the act of buying goods and services for the Government, often (and 
mistakenly) considered synonymous with acquisition; it is instead one of the many functions 
performed as part of the acquisition process. 
Procurement Agency - refers to the General Headquarters, Armed Forces of the 
Philippines for acquisitions, under the capability, materiel and technology development 
component of the AFPMP. It refers to the Major Services for projects falling under the other 
components of the program.  
Program Manager - is the individual within the DoD chartered to manage an acquisition 
program. The program manager has no other command or staff responsibilities. 
Weapon System - refers to a combination of one or more weapons with related 
equipment, materials, services, personnel, and means of delivery and deployment required for 
self-sufficiency. It is the end item that will be used to perform the operational requirement of the 
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